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DIRECTIVE

FUNCTIONS OF THE OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1. AUTHORITY

By Military Order of the Commander in Chief, dated 13 June 1942, as amended by Presidential Executive Order of 9 March 1943, the Office of Strategic Services was established as an operating agency of the Government under the direction and supervision of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. FUNCTIONS

The Office of Strategic Services is designated as the agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff charged with the functions and duties described hereinafter in paragraphs 3 to 10, inclusive.

3. SECRET INTELLIGENCE

- a. The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to:
- (1) Collect secret intelligence in all areas other than the Western Hemisphere by means of espionage and counter-espionage, and evaluate and disseminate such intelligence to authorized agencies. In the Western Hemisphere, bases already established by the Office of Strategic Services in Santiago, Chile, and Buenos Aires, Argentina, may be used as ports of exit and of entry for the purpose of facilitating operations in Europe and Asia, but not for the purpose of conducting operations in South America. The Office of Strategic Services is

authorized to have its transient agents from
Europe or Asia touching points in the Western
Hemisphere transmit information through facilities
of the Military Intelligence Service and of the
Office of Naval Intelligence.

- (2) Establish and maintain direct liaison with Allied secret intelligence agencies.
- (3) Obtain information from underground groups by direct contact or other means.
- (4) Establish and maintain direct liaison with military and naval counter-intelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other Government agencies engaged in counter-intelligence.

4. RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS

The Office of Strategic Services will (1) furnish essential intelligence for the planning and execution of approved strategic services' operations; and (2) furnish such intelligence as is requested by agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the armed services and other authorized Government agencies. To accomplish the foregoing no geographical restriction is placed on the research and analysis functions of the Office of Strategic Services, and the following specificic activities will be

As used in this directive, the term "strategic services" includes all measures (except those pertaining to the Federal program of radio, press, publication and related foreign propaganda activities involving the dissemination of information) taken to enforce our will upon the enemy by means other than military action, as may be applied in support of actual or planned military operations or in furtherance of the war Approved For Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP80B01676R002500050004-8

performed:

- a. Accumulation, evaluation and analysis of political, psychological, sociological, economic, topographic and military information required for the above.
- <u>b</u>. Preparation of such studies embracing the foregoing factors as may be required.
- c. Preparation of the assigned sections of Joint Army and Navy Intelligence Studies (JANIS), together with such maps, charts and appendices as may be required to accompany these sections.
- d. Preparation of such maps, charts and illustrations as may be requested by the agencies of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and authorized agencies of the War and Navy Departments.

5. SECRET OPERATIONS

The secret operations included in this paragraph will be conducted within enemy countries and enemy occupied or controlled countries, and from bases within other areas, including neutral areas, where action or counter-action may be effective against the enemy.

a. Morale Subversion

The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for the execution of all forms of morale subversion by diverse means including:

False rumors, "freedom stations", false leaflets and false documents, the organization and support of fifth column activities by grants, trained personnel and supplies

and the use of agents, all for the purpose of creating confusion, division and undermining the morale of the enemy.

b. Physical Subversion

The Office of Strategic Services is responsible for of the execution/approved special operations including:

- (1) Sabotage.
- (2) Organization and conduct of guerrilla warfare.

 Personnel to be provided for guerrilla warfare will be

 limited to organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei.
- (3) Direct contact with and support of underground resistance groups.
- (4) The conduct of special operations not assigned to other Government agencies and not under the direct control of the theater or area commanders.
- (5) The organization, equipment and training of such individuals or organizations as may be required for special operations not assigned to other Government agencies.

6. STRATEGIC SERVICES -- PLANNING, EXECUTION, DOCTRINE AND TRAINING

The Office of Strategic Services is charged with:

a. The planning, development and execution of strategic services for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the development of doctrine covering such services.

b. The training of personnel for strategic services.

7. WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

The Office of Strategic Services will be responsible for the progressive and orderly development of operating procedure and the characteristics of special weapons and special equipment for special operations not assigned or pertinent to other U.S. Government agencies. When approved by the Office of Scientific Research and Development, such special weapons and special equipment may be developed by the Office of Strategic Services in collaboration with the Office of Scientific Research and Development. The characteristics having been so established will be presented to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff and the Vice Chief of Naval Operations for transmittal to the appropriate supply agency for further development or procurement. Weapons, equipment and supplies for the Office of Strategic Services will be programmed and procured in accordance with the pertinent Joint Chiefs of Staff directives and current Army and Navy instructions based thereon.

8. CONTACT WITH FOREIGN NATIONALITY GROUPS

The Office of Strategic Services is authorized, in consultation with the Department of State, to maintain contact with foreign nationality groups and individuals in the United States for the purpose of obtaining information.

9. <u>COMMUNICATIONS</u>

The Office of Strategic Services shall be responsible for the planning, organization and operation of essential communications required for field and training activities in connection with approved projects. Existing communication facilities will be utilized wherever possible. The programming and procurement of communications equipment will be made only after approval therefore has been secured from the Assistant Chiefs of Staff, G-4, War Department General Staff, or the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, depending on which service has primary interest in the particular type of communications equipment under consideration.

10. LIAISON WITH OTHER AGENCIES

The Office of Strategic Services is authorized to maintain liaison with other interested Government agencies.

11. COORDINATION OF STRATEGIC SERVICES PROGRAMS

Strategic services programs are supplementary to and must be coordinated with military programs. To insure this, a planning group to act as a joint medium shall be set up in the Office of Strategic Services for supervising and coordinating the planning and execution of the strategic services programs. The Office of Strategic Services Planning Group shall consist of:

a. One member appointed by the Secretary of State, two members appointed by the Chief of Staff, U.S.Army, two members appointed by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, and four members, including the Chairman, appointed by the Director of Strategic Services.

b. The members of the Office of Strategic Services Planing Group shall be available for full-time duty and shall be
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c. An Advisory Committee comprising representatives from the Office of Economic Warfare, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Treasury Department and from time to time representatives of such other Government agencies as may be called upon to serve, shall be set up to serve with the Planning Group, either as individual members or as a committee when requested by the Chairman of the Group, to consider matters affecting the respective agencies represented on the Committee. Members of the Advisory Committee will advise the Planning Group as to how their respective agencies can be of assistance in insuring the success of strategic services plans.

d. All major projects and plans for strategic services will include measures for political, cultural and economic pressures to be applied. In the case of economic pressures the projects and plans will indicate only the results desired from the Office of Economic Warfare.

e. All major projects and plans for strategic services will be integrated with military and naval programs by the Office of Strategic Services Planning Group and, after approval by the Director of Strategic Services, submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners for final approval.

12. GENERAL PROVISIONS

a. Interchange of Information.

The Military Intelligence Service, the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Intelligence Service, Office of Approved For Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP80B01676R002500050004-8

Strategic Services, will provide for the complete and free interchange of information, evaluated as to creditability of source, required for the executive of their respective missions.

b. Security Control.

The timing of strategic services measures initiated in the United States is subject to the direction of Security Control.

c. Control by Theater Commanders.

All activities within organized theaters or areas are subject to direct control by the commander concerned who is authorized to utilize the organization and facilities of the Office of Strategic Services in his theater or area in any manner and to the maximum extent desired by him.

1941

MEMORANDUM OF ESTABLISHMENT OF SERVICE OF STRATEGIC INFORMATION

Strategy, without information upon which it can rely, is helpless. Likewise, information is useless unless it is intelligently directed to the strategic purpose. Modern warfare depends upon the economic base -- on the supply of raw materials, on the capacity and performance of the industrial plant, on the scope of agricultural production and upon the character and efficacy of communications. Strategic reserves will determine the strength of the attack and the resistance of the defense. Steel and gasoline constitute these reserves as much as do men and powder. The width and depth of terrain occupied by the present day army exacts an equally wide and deep network of operative lines. The "depth of strategy" depends on the "depth of armament."

The commitment of all resources of a nation, moral as well as material, constitute what is called total war. To anticipate enemy intention as to the mobilization and employment of these forces is a difficult task. General von Bernhardi says, "We must try, by correctly foreseeing, what is coming, to anticipate developments and thereby to gain an advantage which our opponents cannot overcome on the field of battle. That is what the future expects us to do."

Although we are facing imminent peril. we are lacking in effective service for analyzing, comprehending, and appraising such information as we might obtain (or in some cases have obtained), relative to the intention of potential enemies and the limit of the economic and military resources of those enemies. Our mechanism of collecting information is inadequate. is true we have intelligence units in the Army and the Navy. We can assume that through these units our fighting services can obtain technical information in time of peace, have available immediate operational information in time of war, and, on certain occasions, obtain "spot" news as to enemy movements. But these services cannot, out of the very nature of things, obtain that accurate, comprehensive, long-range information without which no strategic board can plan for the future. And we have arrived at the moment when there must be plans laid down for the spring of 1942.

We have, scattered throughout the various departments of our Government, documents and memoranda concerning military and naval and air and economic potentials of the Axis which, if gathered together and studied in detail by carefully selected trained minds, with a knowledge both of the related languages and techniques, would yield valuable and often decisive results.

Critical analysis of this information is as presently important for our supply program as if we were actually engaged in armed conflict. It is unimaginable that Germany would engage in a \$7 billion supply program without first studying in detail the productive capacity of her actual and potential enemies. It is because she does exactly this that she displays such a mastery in the secrecy, timing and effectiveness of her attacks.

Even if we participate to no greater extent than we do now, it is essential that we set up a central enemy intelligence organization which would itself collect, either directly or through existing departments of Government, at home and abroad, pertinent information concerning potential enemies, the character and strength of their armed forces, their internal economic organization, their principal channels of supply, the morale of their troops and their people and their relations with their neighbors or allies.

For example, in the economic field there are many weapons that can be used against the enemy. But in our Government, these weapons are distributed through several different departments. How and when to use them is of vital interest not only to the Commander-in-Chief but to each of the departments concerned. All departments should have the same information upon which economic warfare could be determined. Approved for Release 2002/10/21: CIA-RDP80B01676R002500050004-8

To analyze and interpret such information by applying to it not only the experience of Army and Naval officers, but also of specialized, trained research officials in the relative scientific fields (including technological, economic, financial and psychological scholars), is of determining influence in modern warfare.

Such analysis and interpretation must be done with immediacy and speedily transmitted to the intelligence services of those departments which, in some cases, would have been supplying the essential raw materials of information.

But there is another element in modern warfare, and that is the psychological attack against
the moral and spiritual defenses of a nation. In
this attack, the most powerful weapon is radio. The
use of radio as a weapon, though effectively employed
by Germany, is still to be perfected. But this perfection can be realized only by planning, and planning
is dependent upon accurate information. From this information, action could be carried out by appropriate
agencies.

The mechanism of this service to the various departments should be under the direction of a

Coordinator of Strategic Information, who would be responsible directly to the President. This Coordinator could be assisted by an advisory panel consisting of the Director of F.B.I., the Directors of the Army and Navy Intelligence Service, with corresponding officials from other Governmental departments principally concerned.

The attached chart shows the allocation of and the interrelation between the general duties to be discharged under the appropriate directors. Much of the personnel would be drawn from the Army and Navy and other departments of the Government, and it will be seen from the chart that the proposed centralized unit will neither displace nor encroach upon the FBI, Army and Navy Intelligence, or any other department of the Government.

The basic purpose of this Service of Strategic Information is to constitute a means by which the
President, as Commander-in-Chief, and his Strategic
Board would have available accurate and complete enemy
intelligence reports upon which military operational
decisions could be based.

William J. Donovan

Washington, D. C.

June 10, 1941